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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE PLANNED
UNIT DEVELOPMENT STATUTE IN PENNSYLVANIA
Rapid expansion of metropolitan areas and an increased demand
for a variety of land uses has created an urgent need for re-evaluation
of the institutional and legal devices used to guide growth. Traditional
zoning ordinances and subdivision regulations' are often ineffective
and insufficient to deal with modern housing and urban development
problems.2 The majority of zoning ordinances employ a lot-by-lot or
"cookie-cutter" technique3 that creates a patchwork of homogeneous
homes in sterile community units.4 The fear of administrative abuse
1. See generally Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962);
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Village 2
at New Hope, Inc. Appeals, 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (196G); National
Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215
A.2d 597 (1965); Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d
7 (1960); 1 R. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING ch. 1 (1968);
D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA ch. 3 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ZONING
DILEMMA]; E. YOKLEY, THE LAW OF SUBDIVISIONS (1963); Johnston, Develop-
ments in Land Use Control, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 399 (1970); Yearwood,
Accepted Controls of Land Subdivision, 45 J. URBAN L. 217 (1967).
2. See Village 2 at New Hope, Inc. Appeals, 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81
(1968); ZONING DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 21; THE COMMUNITY BUILDERS
HANDBOOK 68 (Anniversary ed., McKeever ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
COMMUNITY BUILDERS HANDBOOK]; Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation and the
New Pennsylvania Procedures, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1972); Sternlieb,
Burchell, Hughes & Listokin, Planned Unit Development Legislation: A Sum-
mary of Necessary Considerations, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 71, 72-73 (1974) [herein-
after cited as Sternlieb et al.].
3. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc. Appeals, 429 Pa. 626, 629, 241 A.2d 81,
83 (1968); Hanke, Planned Unit Development and Land Use Intensity, 114 U.
PA. L. REV. 15 (1965); Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge
to Established Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. Rav.
47 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Krasnowiecki].
4. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN AND RURAL
AMERICA, POLICIES FOR FUTURE GROWTH 108 (1968); J. DELAFONS, LAND-USE
CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES 48 (1962); Krasnowiecki, supra note 3, at 47.
Such homogeneity is not only aesthetically displeasing but also socially harmful
because it creates segregation along economic, social and racial lines. Newsom,
Zoning for Beauty, 5 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 1 (1969); Sager, Tight Little
Isands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 767, 780 (1969); Williams & Wacks, Segregation of Residential Areas
Along Economic Lines: Lionshead Lake Revisited, 1969 WIs. L. REv. 827; Note,
Snob Zoning: Developments in Massachusetts and New Jersey, 7 HAav. J.
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of discretion has prompted legislatures to enumerate precise standards
and criteria. 5 Land use controls tend to be rigid and constraining
because of the belief that they must be self-administering and non-
discretionary.6
Planned Unit Development (PUD) 7 was instituted to introduce
more flexibility into the planning process. The PUD concept" at-
tempts to set aside predetermined land use controls in favor of greater
administrative discretion for local authorities.0 "The task of filling
in the particular district with real houses and real open spaces
then falls upon the planning commission usually working in con-
junction with an individual large scale developer."',. According
to Professor Jan Krasnowiecki, one of the originators of the PUD
concept and a participant in the drafting of a model PUD statute,1
PUD establishes a procedure "under which a municipality would
LEGIS. 246 (1970); Note, Suburban Zoning Ordinances and Building Codes:
Their Effect on Low and Moderate Income Housing, 45 NoTRE DADsa LAW.
123 (1969).
5. Krasnowiecki, Legal Aspects of Planned Unit Development in Theory and
in Practice, in THE FRONTIERS OF PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT: A SYNTHESIS
OF EXPERT OPINION 99, 100 (R. Burchell ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as FRON"
TIERS].
6. The rigid and highly detailed requirements of standard controls are recog-
nized as the reason for uniformity in dwelling design. Id.
7. Krasnowiecki, supra note 3, at 48; Mandelker, Reflections on the American
System of Planning Controls: A Response To Professor Krasnowiecki, 114 U. PA.
L. REv. 98, 99 (1965); Sternlieb, Burchell & Hughes, Planned Unit Develop-
ment: Environmental Suboptimization, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 694 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Planned Unit Development]; Sternlieb et al., supra note 2, at
72-76; Subcomm. of the Comm. of Public Regulation of Land Use, Planned
Unit Developments and Floating Zones, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
61 (1972). Planned Unit Residential Development is a more limited form of
PUD in terms of the extent and variety of nonresidential uses included. In all
other respects PURD is essentially the same concept as PUD.
8. For a discussion of the PUD concept that provides an excellent background
with graphic illustrations see R. BURCHELL & J. HUGHES, PLANNED UNIT DEVELOP-
MrENT-NEw CoNuNITIES AmERICAN STYLE (1972) [hereinafter cited as
BURCHELL & HUGHES].
9. Id. at 23; FRONTIERS, supra note 5, at 100; Planned Unit Development,
supra note 7, at 694.
10. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc. Appeals, 429 Pa. 626, 629, 241 A.2d 81,
83 (1968); cf. Chrinko v. South Brunswick Township Planning 3d., 77 N.J.
Super. 594, 187 A.2d 221 (L. Div. 1963).
11. R. BABcocK, D. MCBRIDE & J. KRASNOWIECK!, SUGGESTED LEGISLATION
FOR PLANNED UNIT RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT pt. II (1965) (Technical Bull.
No. 52, Urban Land Institute).
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PENNSYLVANIA PUD STATUTE
be encouraged to throw away the book and sit down with the
developer to negotiate a better product, hopefully a less expensive
one for the consumer."' -
The PUD concept is attractive for several reasons. It permits a
mixture of land uses,' 3 promotes creativity in design (including both
clustering and mixing of dwelling types),'4 provides for open space
either through public ownership or use and maintenance by the
residents, 15 and allows the developer to harmonize his design with
the environmental features of his tract.'6 PUD thus provides a
flexibility that traditional zoning lacks.'7  The planning agency
exercises more control over developments under PUD than under
zoning ordinances1s In addition, the concept is readily adaptable to
existing administrative institutions.19 Thus the PUD concept maxi-
mizes the developer's choices by minimizing legal impediments, gives
greater discretion to the municipality by providing desirable flexi-
bility, and minimizes environmental damage.20
The great majority of communities adopting PUD provisions have
included them in the local zoning ordinance. As an adjunct of the
zoning ordinance, the PUD provision may take the form of a floating
zone, a conditional use, or a special exception.21 Since the usual
12. FRONTIERS, supra note 5, at 107 (emphasis in original).
13. Co. imuNITy BUILDERS HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 100; Lloyd, A De-
veloper Looks at Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 3, 4 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Lloyd].
14. Nelson v. South Brunswick Planning Bd., 84 N.J. Super. 265, 201 A.2d
741 (App. Div. 1964); COMMUNITY BUILDERS HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at
99-104; Krasnowiecki, supra note 3, at 49; Lloyd, supra note 13, at 4; cf.
Chrinko v. South Brunswick Township Planning Bd., 77 N.J. Super. 594, 187
A.2d 221 (L. Div. 1963).
15. BURCHELL & HUGFES, supra note 8, at 29; COMMIIUNITY BUILDERS HAND-
BOOK, supra note 2, at 99-101; Hanke, supra note 3, at 19.
16. Lloyd, supra note 13, at 4.
17. Planned Unit Developments and Floating Zones, supra note 7, at 62; Com-
ment, Planned Unit Development, 35 Mo. L. REv. 27 (1970).
18. BURCHELL & HUGHES, supra note 8, at 44.
19. Id. at 45; FRONTIERS, supra note 5, at 101; Sternlieb et al., supra note 2,
at 75-76. A single approving agency would consider the elements of development
falling within both the zoning power (use, bulk and location) and subdivision
control (streets, sidewalks, grading, lighting, etc.). See R. BABCOCK, D. MCBRIDE
& J. KRASNOWIECKI, supra note 11, at pt. II.
20. Mandelker, supra note 7, at 99.
21. Sternlieb et al., supra note 2, at 76-77; see D. MANDELKER, CONTROLLING
PLANNED RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS (1966) (ASPO monograph); Planned
Unit Developments and Floating Zones, supra note 7, at 63.
1975]
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judicial approach in conditional use and floating zone cases 2  allows
considerable planning agency discretion, much of the "real" planning
occurs during the administrative review process.
Pennsylvania was one of the first states to enact PUD enabling
legislation.23 The state statute, based on Professor Krasnowiecki's
model,24 provides general requirements and standards that a PUD
proposal must meet, establishes a two-step procedure for tentative
and final approval, and specifies its relationship to other land use
control provisions.25 Pursuant to this statute, local governmental
units enact planned residential development ordinances. The local
boards then make the required statutory findings as specified PUD
proposals are brought before it. The findings of fact include, but
are not limited to, the following: (1) consistency with the compre-
hensive plan; (2) consistency with the zoning and subdivision regu-
lations; (3) adequacy of the amount and purpose of common open
space; (4) relationship between project design and public services;
(5) effect of the plan on the neighborhood; and (6) consistency
with the public interest.2G Despite the straightforward procedure
22. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E,2d 731,
105 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1951); Archdiocese of Portland v. County of Washington,
254 Ore. 77, 458 P.2d 682 (1969).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10701-12 (1972). The Pennsylvania PUD
statute was enacted as a section of the Municipalities Planning Code, Pennsyl-
vania's comprehensive enabling statute,
to encourage innovations in residential development and renewal so
that the growing demand for housing may be met by greater variety in
type, design and layout of dwellings and by the conservation and more
efficient use of open space . . . , to provide a procedure which can relate
the type, design and layout of residential development to the particular
site and the particular demand for housing . . . , and to insure that the
increased flexibility of regulations . . . is carried out . . . without undue
delay ....
Id. at § 10701. For statutes from other states see note 50 infra.
24. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10705(b) (1972):
The ordinance adopted pursuant to this article shall establish standards
governing the density, or intensity of land use, in a planned residential de-
velopment. The standards may vary the density or intensity of land use,
otherwise applicable to the land under the provisions of a zoning ordinance
of the municipality within the planned residential development ....
26. Id. §§ 10709(b)(1)-(6).
It is important to note that because "local officials do not like the respon-
sibility that comes with a negotiated project" and because "many of them do
not have the professional staff to feel secure that they are entering the nego-
tiations as equals with the developer," they often prefer to have explicit require-
ments. FRONTIERS, supra note 5, at 107. Thus the PUD procedure, designed
[Vol. 9:273
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provided by the statute, it was clear that the PUD's effectiveness would
depend upon judicial reaction to the broad discretion allowed.
In Doran Investments v. Muhlenberg Township Board of Commis-
sioners22- appellant applied to the Township for tentative approval of
a planned residential development as required by the state statute28
and the local ordinance.2 9 The Township board of commissioners
denied approval,30 and the developer appealed. The common pleas
court affirmed.31 The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania re-
versed, holding that the developer had satisfied the standards for
approval contained in the statute and was therefore entitled to
approval. Although a welcome result for developers, the decision
may well prove a setback for the PUD concept itself.
Doran's significance can best be appreciated by placing it in his-
torical perspective.3 2 Prior to the enactment of express enabling
legislation, planned unit development was possible only through
liberal interpretation of existing standard enabling statutes and
local land use control ordinances enacted pursuant thereto. 33  Al-
to encourage flexibility, begins to look like standard zoning as municipalities add
an abundance of specific requirements.
27. 10 Pa. Commw. 143, 309 A.2d 450 (1973).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10707 (1972). The statute emphasizes reducing
potential hindrances that might burden the developer by attempting "to
provide an expeditious method for processing a development plan for a planned
residential development.. . and to avoid the delay and uncertainty which would
arise if it were necessary to secure approval, by a multiplicity of local proce-
dures . . . ." Id.
29. The local ordinance prescribed a minimum land area for a planned resi-
dential development, overall density, maximum number of dwelling units per
acre, and minimum requirements as to lot sizes for single family homes, building
coverage, and off-street parking. The ordinance also required that the area be
serviced by public sewer and water facilities. These and other requirements were
more than adequately met by the developer in Doran. For a discussion of the
basic considerations that must be undertaken prior to developing a local planned
unit development ordinance see Sternlieb et al., supra note 2.
30. Several reasons for denying tentative approval are listed in the Pennsylvania
statute. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10709(b)(1)-(6) (1972).
31. 64 Berks County L.J. 159 (1972).
32. See BURCHELL & HUGHES, supra note 8, at 6-30. The historical perspective
considered in the text is from the developer's point of view and provides a sum-
mary of the developer's concerns prior to the enactment of specific PUJD legisla-
tion. Burchell and Hughes present a more theoretical view of the development
of the PUD concept. Id.
33. Id; see Millbrae Ass'n for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae, 262
Cal. App. 2d 222, 69 Cal. Rptr. 251 (Ct. App. 1968); RK Dev. Corp. v. City
of Norwalk, 156 Conn. 369, 242 A.2d 781 (1968); Village 2 at New Hope, Inc.
19751
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though PUD offered advantages in the abstract, its benefits were
more than offset by the practical risks and legal hindrances involved
in proceeding without express enabling legislation.34 Developers,
whose primary goal is profit maximization, discovered that the risks
of proceeding without a specific PUD enabling statute could operate
to diminish their profits. 35
A developer with a PUD plan for his parcel found that he could
not accurately calculate his costs prior to submitting his plan to the
planning commission for approval. A variety of factors created this
uncertainty: the developer's plan was subject to administrative change
until construction was completed;30 the municipality's zoning37 and
subdivision ordinances,38 as well as its comprehensive plan,", might
require conformity with their provisions; and various hearing re-
quirements posed the risk of further change and delay.40 Moreover,
neighbors challenging the developer could pursue objections raised
at such hearings in court,4 ' in which case unclear judicial and admin-
istrative standards might result in more delay and thus compound
the difficulty of calculating both the investment risk and return. 42
Appeals, 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968); ADVISORY COMM. ON CITY PLANNING
& ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT
OF 1928 §§ 12, 14-15 (1928); Comment, Planned Unit Development, supra
note 17, at 28.
34. See generally Hanke, supra note 3.
35. Id. A detailed analysis of these risks is beyond the scope of this Comment.
For a further discussion of planned unit development see 114 U. PA. L. Rav.
3-135 (1965).
36. Lloyd, supra note 13, at 6-14.
37. E.g., Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964);
Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141
A.2d 851 (1958).
38. Flynn, Practical Problems of a Subdivider's Counsel in Creating a Sub-
division, 58 ILL. B.J. 110 (1969); see, e.g., Forest Constr. Co. v. Planning &
Zoning Comm'n, 155 Conn. 669, 236 A.2d 917 (1967); Burke & McCaffrcy,
Inc. v. City of Merriam, 198 Kan. 325, 424- P.2d 483 (1967); Noble v. Chair-
man & Township Comm'n, 91 N.J. Super. 111, 219 A.2d 335 (App. Div. 1966).
See generally Nelson, The Master Plan and Subdivision Control, 16 MAINE L.
REv. 107 (1964); Yearwood, Subdivision Law: Timing and Location Control,
44 J. URBAN L. 585 (1967).
39. Haar, "In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan". 68 HARV L. REv.
1154 (1955).
40. Krasnowiecki, supra note 3, at 53, 85-88.
41. Id. 55-63.
42. Id. at 65-66; Lloyd, supra note 13, at 6-8:
With the enabling statutes vague, precedents small in number or nonexistent,
[Vol. 9:273
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Finally, if local approval of the plan was also required, the plan
was subject to additional major changes.43 The possibility of plan
changes at each checkpoint transformed the innovative PUD plan
into a highly speculative economic venture that few developers wished
to undertake. 4  The potential for extensive delays was reflected in
bank financing costs.45 Practical production problems arose as sub-
contractors attempted to accommodate plan modifications by develop-
ing new construction methods and retraining their work forces.4"
In addition, the developer faced the risk of incorrectly "gauging the
market," a pitfall inherent in any new venture.4 7 The uncertainties
confronting the PUD developer clearly made the standard subdivision
plan a wiser choice in the absence of specific PUD enabling legisla-
tion.48
Enacting a statute with a view toward obviating these problems
is an essential first step to a successful PUD program.49 After en-
actment, however, the PUD concept cannot become a workable
tool for land use control unless the judiciary interprets the new
PUD provisions ° to permit negotiation between the local agency and
and court decisions devoid of a reliable pattern of interpretation, planned
unit developments are highly vulnerable to challenge. Not only an applicant's
attorney, but the town's attorney as well, will have to meet charges of spot
zoning, contract zoning, arbitrary or discriminatory treatment, contravention
of exi'ting zoning regulations, poorly defined administrative jurisdiction or
presence of procedural defects.
Id. at 7.
43. The Pennsylvania planned residential development statute seeks to minimize
the adverse effects of change or threat of change by the municipal governing
body. An approved PUD plan is not subject to zoning or subdivision
regulations nor to any other modification except with the consent of the
landowner. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10711(d) (1972). It is possible, how-
ever, that political forces could be brought to bear upon the landowner to bring
about changes.
44. Krasnowiecki concisely states the problem: "Is (the developer] likely to
litigate, when the simple answer to his complaint is that he can always go to
standard development?" Krasnowiecki, supra note 3, at 65.
45. Lloyd, supra note 13, at 10-12.
46. Id. at 12.
47. Id. at 12-13.
48. See note 42 supra.
49. Comment, Planned Unit Development, supra note 17, at 42.
50. Several states have enacted specific PUD legislation. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 106-6-1 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-13b
to -13k (Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-725 to -733 (Supp. 1972); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55-54 to -67 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10701-12
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the developer. The statute in Doran did not make clear the extent
of the local board's discretion in its application of the statutory
standards. The choice of floating zones, conditional uses, and similar
discretionary zoning techniques to implement PUD, however, sug-
gested an intent to allow the municipality considerable discretion in
deciding whether, in each case, the statutory standards had been
met. The Doran court foreclosed this possibilitys' by holding that
once the standards set forth in the planned unit development statute
and ordinance have been met, tentative approval must be given.52
Appellee-Township based its denial of the planned residential
development's tentative approval on several grounds. First, the Town-
ship argued that since analogous sections of the Municipalities Plan-
ning Code dealing with the official map,53 subdivision developments,5 '
and zoning ordinances- contained provisions that either directly or
indirectly require compliance with the comprehensive plan, the
proposed development must similarly conform to the comprehensive
plan. The Township specifically alleged that Doran's development
did not meet the comprehensive plan's density requirements and that
it encroached on land designated by the comprehensive plan for a
public school.56 The court, however, found that the statutory language
requiring that PUD applications be based upon the comprehensive
plan did "not mean that the ordinance and such application are to
be controlled by the comprehensive plan."57 Instead, the ordinance
(1974). Other states merely mention PUD in their enabling legislation, leaving
implementation to the municipalities. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-1 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-756(7) (Bums 1974); N.Y. GEN.
CITY LAw § 37 (McKinney 1968); N.Y. ToWN LAw § 281 (McKinney Supp.
1973); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-728 (McKinney Supp. 1973); Onio Rnv, CoDE
ANN. § 303.22 (Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 62.23(7) (b) (Spec. Pamphlet
1974).
51. The decision in Doran rests on specific legislative provisions rather than
on vague notions of public welfare. This means that not only does the statute
relieve the courts from making difficult policy decisions, but it also provides both
the court and the developer with explicit standards. Such specificity eliminates
the uncertainty that made PUD so undesirable to developers.
52. 10 Pa. Commwv. at 151, 309 A.2d at 455.
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10402 (1972).
54. Id. § 10503.
55. Id. § 10606.
56. 10 Pa. Commw. at 152, 309 A.2d at 455.
57. Id. at 154, 309 A.2d at 456, citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10703 (1972).
This is the typical judicial interpretation of a comprehensive plan's effect. See, e.g.,
Village 2 at New Hope, Inc. Appeals, 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968). The
[Vol. 9,273
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was to be viewed as an amendment to the comprehensive plan.58
Secondly, the Township argued that the development did not
conform to local zoning regulations and so constituted an improper
departure from the zoning ordinance. 59 The court believed, however,
that the statute in fact contemplated the use of PUD to alter tra-
ditional zoning regulations. Relying on a rather vague provision
of the PUD ordinance6O and various provisions of the PUD enabling
statute, 1 and construing them in pari materia with a single case 62
and the general nature of PUDs,63 the court held that
a planned residential development must be judged by the stand-
ards set forth in a planned residential development ordinance
and those standards may vary from the requirements of a munici-
pality's zoning ordinance ....
It is the very essence of a planned residential development that
it may diverge from zoning requirements.64
The court also rejected the Township's third justification for
denying approval-that the developer failed to set aside the required
open space before beginning development. Requiring advance desig-
nation of open space has frequently led to unwise choices.65 The
court eliminated this requirement, finding adequate compliance
with the PUD statute if the developer would eventually provide
sufficient open space.66 Moreover, the court considered it immaterial
courts are apparently allowing the PUD approval process to substitute for prior
planning.
58. 10 Pa. Conmmw.'at 154, 309 A.2d at 456.
59. Id. For a discussion of the presumption of validity accorded zoning ordi-
nances see Annots., 86 A.L.R. 659 (1933); 54 A.L.R. 1030 (1928).
60. Muhlenberg Township, Pa., Ordinance No. 106, § 110.2, quoted in Doran
Invs. v. Muhlenberg Township Bd. of Comm'rs, 10 Pa. Commw. 143, 154, 309
A.2d 450, 456 (1973), provides: "All existing ordinances or parts of ordinances
which are contrary to the provisions of this ordinance are hereby repealed to
the extent necessary to give this ordinance full force and effect."
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10705, 10707 (1972).
62. Gettys v. Dillsburg Borough Council, 7 Pa. Commw. 519, 300 A.2d 805
(1973).
63. The court held that PUDs, by their very nature, modify existing zoning
ordinances. 10 Pa. Commw. at 155, 309 A.2d at 457.
64. Id. at 154, 309 A.2d at 456-57.
65. Krasnowiecki, supra note 3, at 50-52.
66. 10 Pa. Commw. at 157-58, 309 A.2d at 458.
1975)
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that the open space was to be reserved to private rather than public
use.
6 7
The Doran result is highly favorable to developers. The sole
ground for disapproval of a plan that meets all the substantive
requirements of the planned residential development ordinance (e.g.,
density, open space, height) is a finding that "circumstances of a
particular matter [are] so exceptional as to support the conclusion
that the plan in one or more respects, stated 'with particularity,'
would not be in the public interest." 8 The decision is significant
because the presumption of validity accorded a PUD plan that
complies with the ordinance decreases investment risk and thereby
encourages developers to use the PUD concept.
67. In support of its conclusion, the court noted that it would be unconstitu-
tional for the Township to require public dedication of the land as a condition
precedent to approval for a lawful use. Id.
Appellee also argued that the plan did not account for increases in traffic
hazards and attendant noise and dirt. The court, however, observed that such
conditions are inevitable and do not by themselves constitute sufficient reason
to refuse a property owner the legitimate use of his land. Id. Under some cir-
cumstances, the police power, purportedly exercised in the public interest, may
be invoked to prevent a developer's plan from being approved. Such a result
generally rests on a common law nuisance theory. See ZONING DILEMMA, supra
note 1, at 23.
Although appellant demonstrated that values of single-family dwellings near
large apartment houses increased, appellee contended that the facts were not suf-
ficient to make any finding on the project's effect on surrounding property values.
The court noted, however, that because "the project would be an 'island . . .
substantially different in character and visible appearances from the surrounding
area' of single-family homes does not ipso facto demonstrate that the project
will have an adverse effect on the neighborhood." Grouping uniform and con-
forming uses is basic to zoning but not to the PUD concept. The Doran court
found that a "planned residential development is by its very nature visually
different from the usual lot development dictated by so-called 'euclidean' zon-
ing." 10 Pa. Commw. at 159, 309 A.2d at 459; see Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); ZONING DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 32; FRoN-
TIRs, supra note 5, at 100, Annot., 54 A.L.R. 1016 (1926). Had there been more
specific findings on the question of adverse community effects the court might
have upheld the board's denial on this point. See RK Dev. Corp. v. City of
Norwalk, 156 Conn. 369, 242 A.2d 781 (1968).
Some issues not raised in Doran remain unresolved. It is not clear what effect
PUDs will have on low-income groups and low-income housing. Part of this
issue is the question whether racial integration will or can be advanced by the
PUD concept. Mandelker, supra note 7, at 99-101. In addition, there remains
the question whether the voice of the "neighboring challenger" has been silenced.
Krasnowiecki, supra note 3, at 55-63; Planned Unit Development, supra note 7,
at 710-12.
68. 10 Pa. Commw. at 159-60, 309 A.2d at 459 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 9:273
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The advantage of certainty given the developer, however, may have
been at PUD's expense. By removing virtually all discretionary
authority from the planning commission, the court has eliminated
the negotiation process considered essential to the PUD concept. The
result may be a loss of control over the developer and his proposal
that will render PUD a weak and ineffective tool for land use regula-
tion. Without some discretionary control over planning elements,
negotiations for innovative design concessions in return for approval
cannot occur. Most significantly, municipalities deprived of all dis-
cretionary authority to prevent developer abuse will probably repeal
their PUD ordinances and return to conventional zoning techniques
to regain some measure of control. Ironically, Doran may actually
relegate developers to traditional procedures.
The Doran court's interpretation of Pennsylvania's recent PUD
statute was doubtless made possible by the broad statutory language.
Since only a few states have adopted PUD statutes,69 other com-
munities may avoid a similar result by including provisions expressly
giving greater discretion to the municipality. The difficulty becomes
one of striking the correct balance between protecting the developer
from arbitrary local decision-making and hamstringing the munici-
pality with an overly rigid legal framework. Doran squarely presents
the problem. Finding the solution will be a difficult and challenging
task for local draftsmen.
Lloyd Mashita
69. See note 50 supra.
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